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Non-technical Summary
Cross-border capital flows have grown exponentially since the late 1970s.
Having reached a peak of 4752 cross-listed companies worldwide in 1997, this
figure has declined to 2787 at the end of 2006. A multitude of competing
and complementing hypotheses tries to explain this tremendous growth and
rapid decline. The scientific debate is far from having reached a definite
conclusion, especially with regards to the effects of listing abroad on the
domestic market environment as well as on non-cross-listing peers. More
concretely, the question is whether the cross-listing behavior of enterprises
from emerging markets affects and contributes to their transmission from
opaqueness to transparency.
This study provides empirical evidence verifying the theory of price dis-
covery for Eastern European enterprises based on their cross-listing on West-
ern European exchanges. None of the companies in focus have more than 17
years of business experience, which provides knowledge about young economies.
Moreover, they provide historical and political insights that were not avail-
able while the Iron Curtain still existed.
The empirical analysis has two dimensions: The evolution of the domes-
tic stock price generates information about the change in the informational
environment while the interdependence between different price quotes ana-
lyzes informational flows. First, the evolutionary perspective reveals that the
stock price information increases by listing abroad since it stimulates com-
petition between different trading locations. Competing market makers or
trading systems have to decrease transaction costs in order to attract trading
volume, and consequently generate more precise or accurate stock pricing.
Second, despite the fact that most of the information is generated and re-
distributed from the domestic stock exchange, foreign markets contribute to
information discovery by generating significant information flows as well.
Moreover, these results provide information on the design of corporate
governance. It is interesting to note that the architecture of the market
system generates effects on information efficiency. The bid-ask spread is
reduced by cross-listings in Frankfurt; informational and liquidity frictions
are reduced by listings in London. While Fernandes and Ferreira (2006)
show that New York cross-listings have an asymmetric impact in stock price
information for enterprises from different countries, my results reveal that
different stock exchanges generate different impacts as well and reveal the
relative importance of sound disclosure standards and superior information.
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Abstract
This study provides empirical evidence verifying the theory of price
discovery for Eastern European enterprises based on their cross-listing
on Western European exchanges. Despite the fact that the cross-
listing behavior of companies has been analyzed very actively since
the mid-70s, many competing hypotheses exist, and the debate is far
from reaching an end. Cumulative average residuals (CARs) docu-
ment increased information efficiency after the listing in Frankfurt or
London. This result is supported by a stylized microstructure model.
To be precise, competition for order flow alleviates informational fric-
tions and reduces dealers’ market power. These properties, however,
are unevenly distributed among the auction system Frankfurt and the
market maker system London. GARCH volatility spillovers strongly
support these results and quantify a dominant role for home markets
in information discovery. Moreover, they provide information on the
relative functions of Frankfurt and London.
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1 Introduction
Cross-border capital flows have grown exponentially since the late 1970s. In
spite of the fact that more than 30 years have passed since Tinic and West
(1974) determined lower bid-ask spreads for cross-listed Canadian enterprises,
the scientific debate is far from having reached a definite conclusion. Quite
the contrary; since then a multitude of competing and complementing hy-
potheses have emerged. The motivation for this study reaches back to Adler
and Dumas (1983). The authors emphasize the analysis of market segmen-
tation as "a key challenge for researchers in international finance." As for
Eastern European enterprises, this gap has not yet been conclusively filled.
In the light of a transaction cost perspective or more generally, an in-
formational perspective, cross-listed securities from Eastern Europe are of
particular interest for a number of reasons. The analysis of enterprises from
former socialist countries provides historical and political insights that were
not available while the Iron Curtain still existed. None of the companies
in focus have more than 17 years of business experience, which relates to
the literature about venture capital. Admittedly, only a minority of Eastern
European enterprises engage in high tech industries, but the majority are
still very young, inexperienced and exhibit rapid economic growth. Most of
the economic activity in these countries is opaque as a result of weak and
seldom enforced disclosure standards. This leads to some central questions
concerning my article: If and to what extent can a cross-listing contribute to
corporate governance? What is the relative importance of external control
for price information when foreign analysts, investors, and disclosure stan-
dards are involved? I will address these questions from two different angels.
First, I will follow the evolutionary perspective (univariate implementation),
and second, I will analyze interdependence (dynamic or multivariate imple-
mentation).
The first part begins with a replication of Alexander et al. (1988) and
analyzes information efficiency relative to the foreign listing. An adequate
introduction will be provided by tracking cumulative average residuals, like
they did. Unfortunately, the shortcoming of this method lies in its bias to
stock market covariation. One should keep in mind that in stock markets with
higher covariation ex ante, less additional information is discovered through
a cross-listing reflected in lower price effects ex post.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the stylized microstructure
model by Domowitz et al. (1998) complements the event-study by analyzing
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competition for order flow after the cross-listing. The decomposition of vari-
ance gives deep insight into the information environment and its evolution,
as soon as an enterprise starts to trade at a foreign exchange.
The second main component is devoted to the characteristics of informa-
tion transmission from one market to the next. Univariate variance decompo-
sitions can neither reply questions for dynamic interdependence nor describe
information channels between markets. A first step to overcome this disad-
vantage is made by Jung and Trost (2002), who perform Granger Causality
and bivariate cointegration tests on a smaller sample of Eastern European
cross-listings in Frankfurt. The aim of this methodology is to simultaneously
characterize impacts to all trading prices for one stock. I will use their work
as a starting point and extend the dataset to enterprises from all Eastern
Europe with cross-listings in Frankfurt as well as in London.
These stocks, traded at three stock exchanges simultaneously, will im-
prove our understanding of objectives for cross-listings in general and stock
exchange characteristics in particular. The empirical analysis here is done
based on GARCH volatility spillovers to quantify the interdependence ap-
propriately.
All results are convincing and homonymous: Informational efficiency in-
creases by listing abroad. This effect is robust to all empirical procedures, to
the number, and to the sequence of foreign listings. In detail, the change in
informational efficiency is positive and decreasing in the number of foreign
listings. It is interesting to note that the architecture of the market system
generates effects on information efficiency. The bid-ask spread is reduced by
cross-listings in Frankfurt; liquidity and informational frictions are reduced
by listings in London. Admittedly, home markets dominate interdependence
among prices, but there is feed-back from foreign information as well. Fi-
nally, there is general consensus among all empirical methodologies about the
learning effect. Managers who are seeking better price information should
apply for a supplementary listing abroad.
Now the question arises: What value is added to the ongoing scientific
debate about cross-listings? My results provide empirical evidence on the
change in the information environment after listing abroad. Price information
increases for enterprises from Eastern Europe that trade at Frankfurt and/or
London stock exchange.
While Fernandes and Ferreira (2006) show that New York cross-listings
have an asymmetric impact in stock price information for enterprises from
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different countries of origin, my results reveal that different stock exchanges
generate different impacts as well. Fernandes and Ferreira (2006) stipulate
that the gain in price information by listing in New York is dependent on
the level of market development in the country of origin. Companies from
countries with high levels of market development profit greatly while those
from countries with lower levels of market development do not gain as much.
Given the increased analyst coverage by listing in the U.S.,1 collecting supe-
rior information on the home market becomes more expensive, and insiders
are crowded out. For enterprises from less developed countries, the loss in
private information collection is not compensated by the rise in marketwide
information, leading to a decrease of idiosyncratic return variation for cross-
listings in the U.S. From an efficiency perspective, European markets are
often perceived as being inferior to American markets. This explains why Eu-
ropean stock exchanges attract cross-listings from less developed countries,
while high tech enterprises from industrialized countries leave for New York.
Obviously, this explains the results of my analysis, which finds increased in-
formation efficiency by listing in Frankfurt, and surprisingly in London as
well. Despite the fact that the U.K. and U.S. have comparable legal tradi-
tions, London cross-listings do not generate the same amount of marketwide
information that reduces the incentive to collect inside information like a
New York cross-listing would do.
Moreover, both results motivate debate on stock exchange policy. On
one hand, they underscore the potential of sound disclosure standards and
their enforcement as a way to mitigate insider trade. On the other hand,
cross-listings reveal the relative importance of insider and analyst groups in
the pricing of securities. In this sense, regulatory bodies may gain by ana-
lyzing this event in more detail. As an aspect of the general question of why
companies list abroad, my paper follows a straight empirical approach and
addresses informational effects on a sample of Eastern European enterprises.
As the two examples from the beginning illustrate, market segmentation
was one of the first ideas to have been analyzed by means of cross-listed
stock price data. On the empirical side, most of the studies calculate Cumu-
lative Average Residuals (CARs) around the listing date, and determine a
pre-listing run-up and a post-listing decline.2 These empirical findings have
1 See for example Bailey et al. (2005), Lang et al. (2003), or Lang et al. (2004).
2 One of the most important event studies comes from Alexander et al. (1988) and is
cited in more detail, later in this article. Other important empirical contributions come
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motivated contributions from the theoretical side as well. Seminal papers
have been written by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Errunza and
Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), and Alexander et al. (1987),
and explain share price reactions to cross-listing decisions. Merton (1987)
and Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) show that more than market seg-
mentation and investment barriers are needed to explain the cross-listing
phenomenon. Listing abroad reduces the cost of capital since it alleviates
the premium, which has to be paid to local investors for their inability to
diversify risk globally.
Another motivation for listing abroad is a higher expected liquidity and
price efficiency. The seminal models of Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) are introduced to the cross-listing world by Chowdhry and
Nanda (1991), and are developed further by Foucault and Gehrig (2007). All
these models assume asymmetric information between informed and liquidity
traders. For informed traders it is easier to exploit informational advantages
in more liquid markets. Foucault and Gehrig (2007) relate this aspect to
the corporate governance literature and model how the enterprise manage-
ment can learn about their investment decisions from the stock exchange. As
Chen et al. (2007) show, more efficient information generates more efficient
investment decisions.3
A different strand of the literature has evolved on this agency conflict.
Clearly, investors profit from decreasing spreads, higher liquidity and infor-
mation efficiency as well, but it is up to management to decide about the
listing location. The seminal Stulz (1999) critique and contributions by Cof-
fee (1999), and Coffee (2002) were the founding fathers of the "bonding"
hypothesis and built another bridge to the corporate governance literature.
As a starting point, each model uses management’s ability to extract private
benefits from the firm.4
In compliance with Foucault and Gehrig (2007), the central motivation
for listing abroad is a specific growth opportunity that can only be pursued
by raising capital. Listing abroad is one mechanism to "bond" managers in
order to prevent them from expropriating investors since it imposes higher
from Miller (1999) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999).
3 These results are supported by Doidge et al. (2004), Rajan and Zingales (2004), Lou
(2005), Bakke and Whited (2006), among others.
4 Merton (1987) followed a different idea and analyzed management’s market timing
for cross-listings.
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disclosure standards, improved regulations and a better legal environment,
and consequently attracts investors. After having raised capital by complying
with higher listing standards, management is able to pursue the enterprise’s
growth opportunity and has a higher potential for private benefits. Doidge
et al. (2004) offer empirical support for the bonding hypothesis and show
that the cross-listing premium is higher for firms from countries with poorer
investor protection and is positively correlated with future growth opportu-
nities.
However, the bonding hypothesis is still disputed.5 One reason, for ex-
ample, is that the SEC pursues a "hands-off" policy for enterprises located
outside the U.S. (Siegel (2005)). All things considered, legal enforcement
varies significantly differently between domestic and foreign firms around the
world and highlights the notion that effective legal bonding is rather difficult
to achieve.
This weakness of the legal bonding hypothesis has produced a variety
of further articles in which the effects of a cross-listing on the market for
corporate control are shown. Evidently, the cross-listing decision is motivated
by an increased access to capital in the foreign market. However, the pool
of additional capital can only be achieved for enterprises that are able to
bear the substantial costs which arise when listing abroad as a consequence
of different disclosure standards and legal requirements. Those that remain
with a local listing face a higher cost of capital since investors interpret the
listing decision as an indication of quality.6
These arguments point to the notion that we still need better insight into
information discovery since it affects price discovery and corporate gover-
nance considerably. Fuerst (1998) and Moel (1999) show that security prices
increase with the level of information disclosure. Moreover Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (2006) question the position Huddard et al. (1999) took of a "race
for the top" among listing standards by determining a separating equilib-
rium of different exchanges with different listing standards. Assuming that
enterprises behave rationally, only those with a net benefit from cross-listing
will apply for a listing abroad.7
5 See for example King and Segal (2003), Pinegar and Ravichandran (2003), Pinegar
and Ravichandran (2004), or Burns (2004).
6 For theoretical support see Akbel (2007), and for empirical support see Frost and
Pownall (1994), Melvin and Valero-Tonone (2004), and Lee (2004).
7 Litvak (2007a) and Litvak (2007b) offer empirical support for this line of argument,
and analyze the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the cross-listing premium.
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One part of this study is exclusively devoted to this competition aspect.
Domowitz et al. (1998) analyze competition for order flow after the cross-
listing and disaggregate price information to several sources. "Heightened
intermarket competition may narrow domestic market spreads, but order
flow migration may result in lower domestic market liquidity and may in-
crease price volatility." Thus, price variation is decomposed into base-level
volatility arising from imperfect competition and transitory volatility arising
from trading frictions and information asymmetry. Thereupon, the authors
test their microstructure model on a sample of Latin-American enterprises
which cross-list in the U.S. However, as it is straightforward to generalize
their empirical test to more than two markets, I will consequently do so in
the remainder of this paper.
Other interesting articles and hypotheses could and should be presented
to complete an adequate literature overview. However, Karolyi (1998) and
Karolyi (2006) show that it is hard to do full justice to the academic litera-
ture on cross-listings. In his subsequent article he acknowledges that it was
already challenging to summarize more than 70 contributions for his earlier
survey. But, as the intention of this article does not lie in performing a com-
plete survey, I will have to limit the literature discussion to this extent in
order to focus on a straight empirical approach.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of the
dataset. All empirical analysis is performed in the following sections 3 and
4. First, an evolutionary perspective uses univariate approaches to analyze
consequences of cross-listings for stock prices on home markets. Second,
multivariate approaches are used to characterize interdependence for multiple
price quotes after the cross-listing. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the
paper.
2 Data
In order to analyze information discovery from Eastern European cross-
listings, high frequency prices for a range of enterprises that are registered in
a former socialist country and trade at multiple European stock exchanges
are needed. The data for this exercise comes from Thomson Financial Datas-
tream, which provides daily closing prices.
Table 1 reports a detailed overview on Eastern European stock exchanges
and their trade. In general, Frankfurt and London close later, which may gen-
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erate a favorable picture of information discovery in those foreign markets.8
Lacking reliable tick data from Eastern European stock exchanges, which
are necessary to control for this disadvantage, we will see that this bias is of
minor importance. Most home markets remain dominant even after a long
period of foreign trade.
As a starting point for my analysis, I chose a period that begins with
the fall of the Iron Curtain on 01/01/1991 and ends 12/31/2006. Since data
availability for Eastern European stock prices is moderate, sample selection
is processed in a pragmatic way. I proceed by identifying stock quoted en-
terprises from these countries as a potential target group and then selecting
those that are listed at home and either in Frankfurt, London or both foreign
markets.
These trading places are especially well suited to provide evidence on
information discovery by listing abroad. Both are among the world’s leading
stock exchanges, and attract many Eastern European enterprises, some of
which even go public abroad. Furthermore, this setup allows for comparisons
at the enterprise level and provides microstructure evidence about different
trading systems as well: Frankfurt is organized as an auction system and in
London order clearing is processed via market makers.
However, some enterprises require exclusion. Here, illiquidity is the main
obstacle. Another disadvantage is irregular trading and delisting for a sig-
nificant number of companies. Due to this fact, the dataset involves 34
enterprises from six countries: Croatia (1), Czech Republic (7), Estonia (3),
Hungary (16), Poland (6), and Russia (1).
Table 2 presents listing activity for the full sample. In particular, I report
trading places with the listing type and initial listing times for each enterprise.
All but one stock are traded in Frankfurt, either by depository receipt or
directly. 13 companies trade in London as well, and Bank BPH is exclusively
cross-listed there.
If a cross-listing occurred earlier than one year after the IPO, the precise
number of trading days before will be calculated in the remark column. On
the one hand, fast orientation to foreign stock markets underscores the rele-
vance of gaining insight on its reasons. On the other hand, this short period
reduces potential for comparisons between ex ante and ex post. However,
8 Schotman and Zalewska (2005) show that low frequency data on Central European
stock markets leads to a significant loss of information. However, the highest frequency
that is available for those enterprises are daily price quotes.
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to get statistical insight into the evolution of price information a sufficient
number of observations is essential.
Moreover, table 2 reveals secondary singularities of the sample: First, it
reports an overrepresentation of Hungarian stocks. I cannot only relate this
finding to a superior general economic environment. The Budapest Stock
Exchange is connected to the Xetra system, which is designed as an elec-
tronic clearing platform for floor trade at Frankfurt stock exchange. Thus,
Hungarian enterprises face only marginal additional fees for direct listing in
Frankfurt, and do not involve a depository intermediary.
Second, the Czech Komercni Banka is dually listed in Frankfurt. GDRs
are introduced on 07/02/1996 and followed by a complementary direct listing
on 12/29/1998. As I will discuss later in this article, this adds an additional
perspective to our view on cross-listings and again underlines their role.
Third, even though the most liquid stocks are selected, three Hungarian
GDRs lose liquidity at the London Stock Exchange over time.
Before turning to methodological details, let me note that all collected
price series are transformed to log differences. Let ri,t = log(pi,t)− log(pi,t−1)
denote the return on a security i in period t, where pt is the stock price. By
applying the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests9 I am able to confirm stationar-
ity, which represents a necessary condition to time series analysis. Descrip-
tive statistics on the whole sample are available in table 3. For completeness,
table 4 reports standard deviations relative to the foreign listing.
3 Univariate Approaches
The empirical implementation is separated into two complementary sections.
First, stock price tracking on the home market provides an evolutionary
perspective on listing activity. I apply two univariate time series imple-
mentations in order to characterize the impact of cross-listings. The second
perspective is that of multiple price quotes on the same underlying. In the
absence of arbitrage opportunities, relative prices are bounded by transac-
tion costs. Interdependence among prices is of interest to this study as well,
and analyzed on the basis of multivariate time series implementations, in the
following section 4.
9 For further discussion see Dickey and Fuller (1981), as well as Dickey and Fuller
(1979).
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3.1 Cumulative Average Residuals (CARs)
On the background of a market segmentation perspective, Alexander et al.
(1988) stipulate that "as long as capital markets are not completely inte-
grated, it is reasonable to expect that stock prices would react to inter-
national listings." An international cross-listing reduces market frictions by
alleviating barriers to international investors, and causes a rise of the equilib-
rium price. This transaction cost effect is adequately exhibited in the seminal
contribution of Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977).
Consequently, my first empirical test replicates their results on a sample
of Eastern European enterprises. Alexander et al. (1988) apply the Mean Ad-
justed Returns technique to analyze the effects of international cross-listings.
This methodology, which is commonly used in literature, is conducive to
the comparison of my results for Eastern Europe with other international
samples.
In detail, I will proceed as follows: Equation (1) defines the return-
generating process on stock i in period t. Projection of idiosyncratic returns
r˜i,t on their long-run means µi yields the abnormal or unexpected returns
ε˜i,t.10
(1) r˜i,t = µi + ε˜i,t
Each return series is conditioned on the cross-listing(s) and residuals are
averaged cross-sectionally relative to those dates.
(2) ARt =
(
1
N
)
·
N∑
i=1
ε˜i,t
Aggregation over different intervals from a to b yields the cumulative
average residuals (CARs).
(3) CARa,b =
b∑
t=a
ARt
10 The long-run mean in equation (1) is used as a proxy for market expectations. There
are good reasons to apply more sophisticated implementations; market or factor models for
example. However, my study uses CARs on a replication argument and as an introduction
for the more advanced microstructure analysis. Therefore I will limit this test to the basic
version.
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However, this method faces a deficiency in the analysis of Eastern Eu-
ropean companies. 16 enterprises perform their cross-listing within the first
year after going public at home. This reduces potential for fair comparisons
of CARs before and after the cross-listing. As a cut-off for this procedure I
chose a minimum of 30 trading days before listing abroad. This decision is
justified since it guarantees a sufficient number of observations for regression
analysis.
Evidently, such a fast orientation on foreign listings not only raises con-
sequences for empirical implementation but is informative about Eastern
European enterprises as well. Even when assuming informationally efficient
markets, it is well understood that the return-generating process will need a
specific period of time after the IPO to converge to equilibrium. For a num-
ber of stocks in the sample, I cannot separate this convergence effect from
learning by cross-listing. However, in the case of a cross-listing contribut-
ing to information efficiency, it may even advance convergence. This learning
perspective brings us back again to the academic discussion between the pro-
ponents of the learning and price discovery theory, and those who favor the
capital constraints theory.11
Since I only analyze stocks with a minimum of 30 trading days before
the cross-listing the sample is reduced to 25 enterprises. First insight to the
regression results is given by Mean Squared Errors (MSE) in figure 1. Five
outliers are excluded since their MSEs are beyond 0.0025. For the figure
however, all numbers are multiplied by 100 to present daily percentages and
better interpretability.
From left to right the three sections depict idiosyncratic MSEs before,
after the first and the second cross-listing (if applicable). Increased infor-
mation efficiency by cross-listing should cause more accurate stock pricing,
and reduce abnormal returns over time. In other words, each function in
the figure should be falling in the cross-listing. However, this is not the case
here.
For the first cross-listing, MSEs decrease only for 11 out of 25 stocks.
Those 10 securities with two foreign listings show five decreases relative to
the non-cross-listed period and six decreases relative to the time after the
first cross-listing.
It is straightforward to discover idiosyncratic dynamics in the figure, but
11 See for example Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Kaplan and
Zingales (2000), or Baker and Wurgler (2002).
10
the general statement remains ambiguous. Consequently, I will present ag-
gregate calculations corresponding to those of Alexander et al. (1988), in
order to provide comparable statistics.12
Figure 2 exhibits CARs over 400 days before and 600 days after the first
cross-listing, and on this aggregate level, it is easy to replicate the typical pre-
listing run-up and the post-listing decline in prices that is found in Eun and
Janakiramanan (1986), Alexander et al. (1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1993),
Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), and Lee (2004). In detail, two
years (400 trading days) before the cross-listing, CARs begin a slight decrease
for one year. From that time on, we are able to recognize the announcement
effect since most ARs are positive, and consequently their sum increases to
become positive in the time surrounding the event. Once the stock is listed
abroad, price quotes decrease.
Two corporate governance mechanisms lie behind these observations and
shape the informational environment: Lang et al. (2003), Lang et al. (2004),
and Bailey et al. (2005) analyze the role of cross-listings on analyst coverage
and find differential increases in the number of analysts per enterprise for
U.S. and U.K. cross-listings. One explanation for the decrease in abnormal
returns after the cross-listing may be a higher level of marketwide information
that is generated by a larger number of analysts, who are attracted by the
trade in Frankfurt or London.
However, as Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show, deals
are informative on the set of information of market participants and insiders
can only exploit superior information to the extent that it is not revealed by
trade. Thus, they have to hide their trade behind the orders of noise traders,
whose information set is orthogonal, and this is the reason why insiders prefer
liquid markets with a larger number of noise traders. Obviously, at least one
of both mechanisms works, and if there is any innovation in the market,
unexpected returns will go to the downside. Idiosyncratic return variation,
which is often used as a proxy for price information efficiency, should increase,
and as the figure clearly reveals, ARs turn negative in the subsequent period.
12 I acknowledge that the comparison of both samples is only feasible with some re-
strictions. First, Alexander et al. (1988) apply this empirical test to a set of companies
that operate in the world’s leading economies compared to this emerging markets sample.
Second, the stocks the authors use have a much longer trading history before applying for
a listing abroad. Third, their article analyzes cross-listings in the U.S., which might pro-
duce different results. One possible reason is the different degree of market development
of U.S. equity markets relative to the European ones.
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Moreover, this pattern is still robust for second cross-listings. Again,
cumulative average residuals decrease over time. In figure 3 the curve that
represents the CARs for 600 observations after the second cross-listing seems
smoother than after the first, which in effect is due to a different time scale.
Three years after the first cross-listing CARs amount -0.7699, while they
amount -0.5321 for the second one. Since the returns are log scaled, both
figures are comparable and it is straightforward to see that the effect from
the second cross-listing is only one-third lower.
Nevertheless, covariation is a critical point for the application of CARs
and for the analysis of price discovery, in general. Let us now assume a two-
stocks-two-country model, in which each stock comes from one country and
is perfectly correlated with its market index, and in which both markets are
also perfectly correlated. As long as we maintain the correlation assumption
on the market side, it follows from a simple portfolio argument that it is
not possible to diversify risk or to learn from listing in the foreign market.
This is the main doubt in Alexander et al. (1988) and causes the authors to
repeat their test methodology on subsamples of Canadian and Non-Canadian
enterprises. They find that Canadian enterprises show the lowest impact
from the U.S. cross-listing, and explain this result by comparatively high
covariation between Canadian and U.S. equity markets.
Based on this example it is straightforward to sketch Roll’s13 argument
which characterizes informational efficiency at the general level. As long as
we maintain perfect correlation between the stock and the market index,
each variation of the stock is a perfect replication of the variation in the
market index, and there is nothing to learn from a specific stock price series
on the company itself. Only if the relative change in the stock price deviates
from the relative change in the market index will it be generated by firm
specific information. Roll uses this "non-synchronicity" as a measure for
price information.
Clearly, open points remain on the question of price discovery and inter-
dependence. Before I come to the analysis of simultaneous trade on differ-
ent locations that generates an interdependent pricing system and requires
treatment on a dynamic level, I will apply a specific type of variance de-
composition, which is the extension of the stylized microstructure model by
Domowitz et al. (1998).
13See Roll (1988).
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3.2 A cross-listing model with competition for order
flow
Domowitz et al. (1998) propose a microstructure model that implements
competition for order flow into the pricing framework. Their main pricing
equation is as follows:
(4) w =
(
s2 + 2λs
) · σ2 (xN)
w, the covariance between the fundamental value of an asset and idiosyn-
cratic income, is increasing in the spread s and decreasing in market liquidity
λ−1. In this context, λ itself is often interpreted as the precision parameter
and relates the model to the asset pricing universe. This covariance is shifted
by the volatility parameter σ2, which depends on total trading activity in the
sense of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Desired orders xk for each trader k are
normalized to unity; +1 (long position), -1 (short position), and 0 (hold),
respectively. Partial market clearing for N investors is calculated by aggre-
gation of xk over all k. Consequently, the variance of successive changes in
closing prices is understood as:
(5) σ2 (r) = γ + λ2 (1− ζ) · (θd + θf )
γ (base-level volatility) is defined as γ = w+σ2 . It represents the volatility
that arises from changes in the bid-ask spread and instantaneous public in-
formation. The second term in equation (5), transitory volatility, represents
information asymmetry, or more generally microstructure frictions that are
inversely related to market liquidity.
This implementation follows the idea that as long as markets are not
perfectly integrated, a cross-listing raises competition for order flow. In a
situation where information costs are comparable between two markets, an
individual investor will direct his order to the market that offers him the
lowest spread. This generates competitive pressure on market makers, who
try to compensate losses from decreasing spreads by increasing volume.
Nevertheless, cross-listings may still increase base-level volatility γ in the
partial market fragmentation setup. According to Domowitz et al. (1998),
the spread reducing effect on w might be overcompensated by σ2 through
weak "intermarket information links or foreign noise traders with low quality
information signals". However, when maintaining the Kyle assumption of
noise traders whose trade is orthogonal to the information set of the insiders,
it is sufficient to assume that the introduction of a stock to the foreign market
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attracts noise traders, who trade with stronger impact (higher σ2 ). In other
words, cross-listings generate adverse effects on base-level volatility since
there is a trade-off between competition and world market risk, and it is an
empirical exercise to analyze the relative size of both effects.
Domowitz et al. (1998) analyze the net effect for equation (5) on a sample
of different stocks issued by 16 Mexican companies that are listing in the
U.S. as ADR14 and find that for most enterprises the effect of decreasing
liquidity after the cross-listing is mitigated by a narrowing of the bid-ask
spread. Before I can relate my results to their study, I have to modify their
econometric test to allow for a second cross-listing, which is performed by
ten enterprises in my sample.
(6) r2t = γt + δt · r2t−1 + λt · Vt + ηt
γt = γ0 + γfr · xfr + γlo · xlo(7)
δt = δ0 + δfr · xfr + δlo · xlo(8)
λt = λ0 + λfr · xfr + λlo · xlo(9)
Equation (6) augments base-level volatility γt and transitory volatility λt
by an autoregressive term to filter for volatility clustering. In the following
lines, all time-varying estimation parameters are decomposed to a basic con-
stant and the cross-listing effect with the dummies for Frankfurt (xfr) and
London (xlo). After cross-listing, the corresponding dummy is set from zero
to one.15 ηt represents the error term and should be white noise for accurate
estimation.
In order to estimate equation (6), collection of additional data about
trading volume is necessary. Since transaction volume from Eastern Europe
is even more scarce than stock price quotes, I only take into consideration
those 20 enterprises that exhibit less than 11% missing values in the volume
series. Knowing that Eastern European stocks are less liquid than those
used in Domowitz et al. (1998), Vt is quantified in ten millions of shares to
determine comparable coefficients.
The system outlined above requires estimation by a heteroskedasticity-
robust Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator. All regressions are
14 Their study covers other aspects as well. They end with a sample of 25 time series
since some of the 16 companies issue stock with ownership restrictions. The authors are
able to isolate the effects of the cross-listing on different classes of assets.
15 Mixed effects are not considered here since there is no theoretical prediction, if, how
and why a network effect from several cross-listings should evolve.
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calculated beginning from the time when the first volume data is registered;
its results are shown in tables 5 to 7. In the tables, results for each enterprise
call for two rows, of which parameter estimates are printed in the first, fol-
lowed by their statistical significance in the second. Parameters with index
fr or lo represent interaction with the corresponding cross-listing dummy.
Table 5 presents the effects after the first cross-listing and is directly com-
parable to the study by Domowitz et al. (1998). Their microstructure model
is also appropriate for the majority of my sample since from 20 regressions,
the natural or non-interacted parameters (γ0, δ0, and λ0) have significant
coefficients in 12, 11, and 13 cases. In order to guarantee positive defi-
niteness of volatility before the cross-listing, each significant γ0 should take
non-negative values, which is the case for my results. The γ0 distribution
is positively skewed with median 0.0005 and mean 0.0007. For the Mexi-
can sample median and mean are definitively higher with 0.0070 and 0.0570.
In this respect, Eastern European markets are more competitive (efficient)
than those of Latin America since the bid-ask spread is substantially smaller.
Natural market variation seems smoother in Europe.
Domowitz et al. (1998) determine positive values for their cross-listing
parameter (the median increase is 0.0240 and the mean increase is 0.2860)
and conclude "a dramatic increase in base-level volatility following the ADR
listing" for those securities that are open to foreign investors. This result is
in line with the foreign market perspective of Fernandes and Ferreira (2006),
who show that price information decreases for enterprises from less developed
countries when they list at New York stock exchange. Eastern European en-
terprises show a different effect; from five significant coefficients, four turn
out negative, and base-level volatility increases only for Fotex after listing in
Frankfurt. This atypical evolution might be caused by a very early introduc-
tion to Western European markets.
Fernandes and Ferreira (2006) find that cross-listings generate more mar-
ketwide information by increased analyst coverage. Thus it is more difficult
and costly to acquire superior information which causes a crowding-out of
insider trades after listing in New York. My results on Eastern European
enterprises neither support these results for Frankfurt cross-listings nor do
they for London cross-listings. Baker et al. (2002) offer supportive empirical
evidence for this finding by comparing analyst and media coverage at Lon-
don versus New York stock exchanges after the listing. They use hits in the
Wall Street Journal and in Financial Times as a proxy for media coverage
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and show that U.S. listings are associated with better media and analyst
coverage as well. Even though the U.S. and the U.K. share the same legal
tradition, the informational environment at the New York Stock Exchange is
superior to that at the London Stock Exchange. This explains why price in-
formation on Eastern European enterprises increases after the cross-listing at
the Western European exchanges, while it decreases for Mexican enterprises
listing in the U.S.
Comparing significant parameters from Latin America with my estimates,
I am able to determine a more symmetric distribution with median -0.0004
and mean taking the same value. Unlike Domowitz et al. (1998), but in line
with Foerster and Karolyi (1998), cross-listings from Eastern European coun-
tries strengthen the competition among market markers. Bid-ask spreads
are reduced for a number of stocks and so are their base-level volatilities. It
is noteworthy that these results still guarantee positive definiteness of the
volatility after the cross-listing, due to the fact that neither interaction term
γfr or γlo turns volatility negative.
Based on trading volume (λ parameters) transitory volatility is analyzed.
λ0 is positive in 12 out of 13 significant cases, and eight significant λfr and λlo
show mixed signs depending on the company. All told, listing abroad reduces
volume dependence from 0.0193 to 0.0126. Median values for significant
parameters are added under the exclusion of Softbank since its coefficients
take absolute values of more than 2.5, which is far beyond the rest of the
sample.
Even though market makers compete for order flow to attract additional
volume, liquidity in the home market is not reduced to a critical extent. In
other words, cross-listing reduces both base-level and transitory volatility.
Furthermore, listing abroad affects the structure of volatility clustering as
well. With the exception of Lukoil, net autocorrelation (δ0 + δfr) is reduced
for all stocks (four cases) that have a significant non-cross-listed term δ0 (11
cases). Given the decreasing dependence on historical price variation, stock
price volatility approaches random walk, which is synonymous to increased
market efficiency.16
These estimates on first cross-listings indicate strong evidence in favor
of competition for order flow. However, alternative hypotheses are able to
16 Again, Fotex might be considered as an outlier in respect of increased autoregressive
effects. Moreover, Unipetrol shows no significant parameter except interacted autoregres-
sion δfr. Given the poor fit, this time series is not supported by the microstructure model
applied.
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justify managerial considerations about second cross-listings.
After the first cross-listing, base-level and transitory volatility decrease.
Consequently, the enterprise management may recognize this and hope for
further smoothing in price variation and transaction cost. This hypothe-
sis is closely related to Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Foucault and
Gehrig (2007), and Chen et al. (2007), who emphasize that managers learn
(for investment decisions) from listing abroad. In particular, Chen et al.
(2007) use idiosyncratic return variation (the (Roll (1988)) criteria of price
non-syncronicity) to analyze an active role of the price. Enterprises focusing
on German and British product markets especially might support this ex-
planation, but it generalizes all enterprises from Eastern Europe which try
to benefit from additional objective expertise from markets that are more
advanced in the sense of market development.
This brings the discussion back to capital constraints arguments. Au-
thors such as Baker et al. (2003) or Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue for a
complementary explanation. In their view, enterprises from less developed
countries in particular seek additional financing by listing abroad.
Both hypotheses may govern decisions about second and third cross-
listings. Moreover, the results in table 6 and 7 even present us with a third
possible alternative. Different legal and listing standards at Frankfurt and
London exchanges generate different consequences for the informational en-
vironment for enterprises that choose among both, and it is not surprising
that the coefficients reveal separate properties for both exchanges.
All significant interaction terms for a Frankfurt cross-listing reduce the
base-level volatility. This finding is still robust for the second direct cross-
listing in Frankfurt from Komercni Banka.17 A Frankfurt cross-listing strength-
ens competition and reduces the bid-ask spread.
However, the effects on transitory volatility are poor and ambiguous for
a Frankfurt listing. Transitory volatility is increasing in the cross-listing for
Telekomunikacja PL by 0.0360, and decreasing for Richter Gedeon by -0.1438.
In contrast, results on the liquidity parameter λlo in London are more consis-
tent. It is also striking to note that all estimates reveal negative coefficients
on significant parameters. I interpret this reduction as a consequence of at-
17 Lukoil results do not converge to the rest of the sample. This time series exhibits
probability for negative price volatility after the cross-listing. If γ0 is interacted, γlo with
-0.0006 will require a minimum trading volume of 222000 to guarantee positive volatility.
Liquidity, however, does not reach this number in 656 observations, which gives reason to
exclude the time series from further analysis.
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tracting foreign investors to Eastern European markets. Without a doubt,
a cross-listing reduces liquidity constraints in the home market, therefore
managers aiming at this effect should perform a cross-listing on LSE.
These new estimates indicate that both exchanges, Frankfurt and Lon-
don, are shaped by a different informational environment: This may come
from the different market architecture and different groups of market partic-
ipants. Listings in Frankfurt with an auction based trading system generate
competitive pressure, consequently drive spreads down, and market makers
in London reduce informational frictions for cross-listed Eastern European
enterprises.
Moreover, my results indicate increased information efficiency for cross-
listed Eastern European enterprises. The spread effect is particularly nega-
tive for a number of enterprises and interestingly, the volume effect is neg-
ative as well. Despite the fact that the roles of foreign exchanges diverge,
the results are robust to the second and third cross-listing. From a technical
point of view, predictability to idiosyncratic return variation is reduced to the
same degree as is volatility clustering. This can be interpreted as evidence
of increased market efficiency.
4 Bivariate Approach
A second aim of this study is to get a better understanding of dynamic
interdependence between trade prices. In order to analyze this system, con-
temporaneous price quotes of different exchanges and an empirical model
without strict exogeneity restrictions are required. The class of GARCH
models provides a useful formulation for that exercise.
Before turning to the technical side, some details on data require par-
ticular attention: Notably, while a number of Hungarian stocks trade very
actively in Frankfurt, London price quotes lose liquidity in the later years of
the sample. On this account, Borsodchem, Richter Gedeon, and Tiszai Vegyi
are no longer considered.
To be sure, I took the possibility of structural breaks into consideration,
and I came to the conclusion that after (each) cross-listing, the following two
weeks (10 trading days) are excluded before (re)estimation.
It is straightforward to understand the idea of Engle (1982) and Boller-
slev (1986) to model not only the return, but also the innovation on a
mean-reverting process with autoregressive and moving-average terms as
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well, which leads to the variance equation:
(10) σ2t = a0 +
q∑
i=1
ai · ε2t−i +
p∑
j=1
bj · σ2t−j
Since then, many variants have been introduced and I apply this basic for-
mulation in addition to two asymmetric models (EGARCH and TGARCH) in
order to allow for leverage effects in the dataset. While the exponential model
of Nelson (1991) only restricts the asymmetric parameter between -1 and 0,
TGARCH18 is bound by the parameter restrictions of the basic model. In
other words a0, ai, bj and the coefficient of the asymmetric parameter should
be positive in order to guarantee non-negative values for σ2t . Bollerslev (1986)
proves that the GARCH process is only stationary if
q∑
i=1
ai +
p∑
j=1
bj < 1.
For the mean equation I do not implement exogenous variables, but limit
on autoregressive and moving-average coefficients as well as a component of
the variance equation, which constitutes the GARCH-in-Mean (GARCH-M)
approach. That is, either the conditional variance, its square root, or its log
is implemented into the mean equation in the case of statistical significance.
In order to obtain parsimonious implementations I do not model more
than two lags in the variance equation. My results acknowledge this conven-
tion, since repeated Lagrange multiplier tests do not reveal further ARCH
effects.
To be sure, I investigate residuals’ and squared residuals’ autocorrelation
and partial autocorrelation functions. Significant deviations in the squared
residual sample would suggest misspecification, since they indicate additional
ARCH effects in the time series.
I repeat this procedure for all symmetric and asymmetric ARCH imple-
mentations on a time series. Having eliminated unreasonable implementa-
tions, I choose the best performing model based on the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC).
All implementations generate a set of residuals that provides evidence of
informational links in the dataset. For this reason, all collected residuals are
squared and lagged by one period and introduced into the variance equation
of a different price quote on the same underlying. This procedure describes
the basic idea of the volatility spillover and was introduced by Engle et al.
(1990), Engle et al. (1994), as well as Hamao et al. (1990). It was applied in a
18See Zakoian (1994) and Glosten et al. (1993).
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wide range of studies, which mainly focused on stock19 and money markets.20
A simple formulation of volatility transmission is presented in the following:
(11) σ2t = a0 +
q∑
i=1
ai · ε2t−i +
p∑
j=1
bj · σ2t−j + d · ξ2t−1
Equation (11) extends the basic GARCH setup from equation (10) by the
spillover term. It represents a directional correlation in the variance equation,
since the lagged, squared error term ξ2t−1 from one price quote is implemented
to the variance equation of the next. If ξ2t−1 is significant, this will suggest
informational interdependence among the trading locations. In this case, the
spillover coefficient d quantifies the extent of information transmission.
As reported in tables 8 through 11, this procedure generates 46 estimates
on stocks after their first cross-listing, 89 estimates after the second, and
26 after the third. For multiple cross-listings a distinction must be made
between the full system, which contemporaneously implements all spillover
parameters, and the reduced system, which only implements a subset. In
particular, each table provides detailed information on enterprises, number
of cross-listings at the time, direction of the spillover, and its effect. Evi-
dently, a number of time series are dropped for the reason that they do not
convey ARCH effects according to the Lagrange multiplier test. In order to
offer a more aggregate perspective on each of those detailed results, table
12 presents average and median coefficients. 38 out of 46 return series for
the first cross-listing, and 57 out of 89 for the second show correlation in the
variance equation. GARCH volatility spillovers provide strong support for
interdependence and the learning hypothesis, and determine results that are
in accordance with the findings on univariate test methodologies: Indeed,
cross-listing is informative.
In detail, my estimates reveal an average spillover coefficient of 0.1355
(median 0.0460) for the first cross-listing. This means lagged, squared resid-
uals for a price quote affect a different price quote on the same underlying
by around 13.55% on average. This effect is even stronger than that of some
estimated AR(1) coefficients of the variance equation. One cannot deny the
existence of a dependence among markets. Relative to these models used
to construct the interaction term, average AR(1) coefficients in the variance
19 See e.g. Hahm (2004), Fabozzi et al. (2004), Booth et al. (1997), or Kim and Rogers
(1995).
20 See e.g. Hahm (2004), Black and McMillan (2004), or Booth and So (2003).
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equation decrease by 3.00% on estimation with spillover parameters. Inter-
estingly enough, marginal learning by the second listing abroad generates
virtually half of the effect of the first one. AR(1)s decrease again by 1.60%
and the average spillover accounts for 0.0967 (median 0.0463) here.
In spite of the fact that the results for the third cross-listing are shown for
completeness, I will not pursue this discussion. Since Komercni Banka is the
only enterprise in the sample, for which I could collect a fourth price quote,
column (4) provides an idiosyncratic perspective. Moreover, the third cross-
listing is a direct listing on the same market, where the company already
trades with GDRs. However, this imposes a limit on general conclusions to
a certain extent.
I proceed by disaggregating average dynamics from the home market
toward foreign markets and vice versa for the first and second cross-listing.
The results suggest a dominant role of the home market even after the second
cross-listing. Here, average spillovers from the home market reach 14.22%.
They are more than six times as large as the spillover back from foreign mar-
kets (2.20%). This relation is even more pronounced on the median figures,
which are nearly twelve times as large. To be sure, only reasonable, non-
negative and significant parameters are taken into consideration for these
aggregates. Concerning the first cross-listing, a lack of significance or neg-
ative coefficients is only determined for spillovers from foreign markets (7
cases). After the second cross-listing, 51 out of 57 insignificant parameters
come from Frankfurt and London. This again points to the notion that the
majority of price discoveries concern the home market.
The second cross-listing allows for an analysis of information flows be-
tween foreign exchanges as well. On average, interdependence amounts to
0.0951, which is around two thirds of the spillover from the home market
and considerably more than that back from the foreign markets. This aspect
leads us back to the discussion on the level of the stock exchange. Results
from the second cross-listing provide evidence on the relative importance of
both foreign stock exchanges for the home markets. It is straightforward
to compare spillovers between Frankfurt and London, as well as their spe-
cific impact on the home market. All in all, there is no distinct winner in
this contest: While I am not able to determine an interdependence among
these foreign exchanges for the Softbank price quotes, it can be understood
that Frankfurt dominates in four enterprises and London dominates in five
enterprises.
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From an individual perspective, it is noteworthy that Fotex, Konzum,
and Lukoil represent the only enterprises in which the spillover from abroad
dominates the spillover from the home market. Yet this result is robust to the
second cross-listing from Lukoil. The five strongest spillovers after the first
cross-listing are on the enterprises Bank BPH, Komercni Banka, Synergon,
Unipetrol, and Egis. Not surprisingly, all spillovers stem from home markets,
but the fact that the Budapest stock exchange only appears twice in this list
was unanticipated. As Hungarian enterprises represent nearly half of the
sample, this finding attributes back to the conclusions made by Alexander
et al. (1988), who suppose that marginal information discovery is weaker
in markets that already have closer informational links. Since the Xetra
platform is used for German and Hungarian stocks, higher informational
covariation is likely. Nevertheless, I cannot exclude a different explanation for
this result: Lacking high frequency data, this study uses daily price quotes.
Consequently, I cannot analyze volatility transmissions during the day. This
disadvantage generates a certain probability that yesterday’s residuals, which
are used to estimate the spillover parameter, lag behind the real information
transmission, which is already comprised in the stock price quote.
5 Conclusion
As the surveys of Karolyi (1998) and Karolyi (2006) document, cross-listings
are very actively debated in the academic literature. The number of contribu-
tions is still growing, and has identified several competing and complementing
hypotheses in order to explain why companies list abroad. My paper con-
tributes to this explanation by analyzing aspects of market segmentation,
information discovery and corporate governance on a sample of Eastern Eu-
ropean enterprises listed on a home stock exchange as well as in Frankfurt,
London or both foreign exchanges. These enterprises are well-suited for this
exercise due to the fact that they actively list on Western European stock
exchanges. Large information differentials between Eastern and Western Eu-
rope help to isolate cross-listing effects on information discovery.
The first empirical part covers an evolutionary perspective and tracks the
influence of foreign listings on the price at home. The second empirical part
analyzes interdependence in the pricing system. In general, two major con-
clusions evolve: Listing on foreign stock exchanges is informative. However,
home exchanges remain dominant.
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The analysis of cumulative average residuals (CARs), which introduces
the study, is of particular importance and suggests increased price efficiency
by listing abroad. A second, more detailed analysis provides clear evidence on
the relative size of two competing effects: On the one hand, competition for
order flow reduces transaction costs that market makers can charge for their
activity. On the other hand, if a substantial part of liquidity is withdrawn
from the home market, frictions may arise. Interestingly, both effects turn
out negative with special roles for the foreign stock exchanges and are robust
to the number and sequence of foreign listings. It can be stated that listing in
Frankfurt reduces the spread, and generates competitive pressure on market
makers, while listings in London bring liquidity to the home market, instead
of withdrawing it.
From an interdependence perspective, I determine strong informational
links between stock price quotes. Admittedly, home markets are dominant,
but information flows back from foreign exchanges as well. After the second
cross-listing, spillovers from foreign markets are 2.20% on average. This is
almost one sixth of the effect coefficient from home markets, for which I de-
termined 14.22% on average. Even if one is not convinced by these results
as evidence for increased information efficiency, the relevance of the decrease
of auto-correlation in the variance equation cannot be disputed. AR(1) co-
efficients drop by 1.60% upon implementation of the second spillover, and
point to a shift of historical information to the information that is generated
at the other trading location.
What exactly can we learn from this empirical exercise? Due to the ab-
sence of alternative considerations such as financial constraints, it is advis-
able for Eastern European managers in search of more efficient stock pricing
to apply for a listing abroad. Cross-listings in Frankfurt reduce base-level
volatility (bid-ask spread), cross-listings in London reduce transitory volatil-
ity (informational and liquidity frictions). Moreover, there is still incentive
to apply for multiple cross-listings, since marginal learning is decreasing but
remains positive in the number of listings.
Do these results indicate a better corporate governance? Cross-listings
in Frankfurt and London do not generate the same amount of market-wide
information that reduces the incentive to collect inside information such as
in New York. This study points to the need for further improvement on the
informational environment. It is still possible to hide informed trade behind
liquidity trade on both European exchanges, in spite of the fact that the
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U.K. has the same legal tradition as the U.S., but also in Frankfurt which
is perceived as being less efficient than London. Fernandes and Ferreira
(2006), however, suggest that enterprises from less developed countries do
not face the same disclosure standards when they list on the same foreign
stock exchange as an enterprise from a developed country. They relate their
thesis to the fact that approval of information or legal enforcement is difficult
across the border.
Lacking additional reliable data, this study also points to the need for
further research on the role of cross-listings for Russian enterprises. Even
though several active exchanges operate in Russia, this study suffers from a
lack of liquid price quotes for listings at home and abroad. If one overcame
this dearth of data, the dominance of London as a foreign market over the
home market Moscow could be tested. In particular, the role of political
change on the amount of information discovery could be analyzed given the
fact that the Russian government has been very actively engaged in exchange
quoted companies in previous years. Moreover, a final note addresses gen-
eral data frequency. It is very likely that further studies may try to collect
intraday data from Eastern European enterprises in order to get a deeper
understanding of informational dynamics. This would allow to relate their
results to Hasbrouck (1995) or Grammig et al. (2005).
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Table 1: Trading Hours at European Stock Exchanges
Country Stock Exchange Trading Hours
Croatia Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE) 10:00am - 2:00pm
01/01/2003: 10:00am - 4:00pm
Czech Republic Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) 8:00am - 4:00pm
(17pm : Publication price quotations)
Estonia Tallinn Stock Exchange (TSE) 10:00am - 1:50pm
(2:05pm - 2:30pm after market trading)
Hungary Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) 9:02am - 4:30pm
Poland Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) 9:00am - 4:30pm
Russia Russian Trading System (RTS) 9:00am - 4:00pm
01/01/2005: 9:00am - 4:00pm
Germany Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (FWB) 01/01/1990: 10:30am - 1:30pm
07/01/1998: 8:30am - 5:00pm
09/20/1999: 9:00am - 5:30pm
06/02/2000: 9:00am - 8:00pm
Floor 01/01/2003: 9:00am - 8:00pm
Xetra 01/01/2003: 9:00am - 5:30pm
UK London Stock Exchange (SEAQ) 9:00am - 5:30pm
This table presents the trading hours at European stock exchanges. All of the data has been collected from official web pages and verified by e-mail
contact. The table indicates that some exchanges changed trading hours very actively.
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Table 2: Listings
Country Firm Listing in Initial Listing Listing in (as) Initial Listing Listing in (as) Initial Listing Remark
Croatia Pliva Zagreb 01/25/1995 Frankfurt (GDR) 01/02/1997 London (GDR) 04/18/1997 -
Czech Republic Cez Prague 11/02/1993 Frankfurt 11/10/1994 - - –
Komercni Banka Prague 03/21/1994 Frankfurt (GDR) 07/02/1996 London (GDR) 08/05/1997 Frankfurt (direct) 12/29/1998
RMS Holding Prague 11/09/1993 Frankfurt 07/08/1996 - - –
Setuza Prague 01/27/1994 Frankfurt 07/30/1996 - - –
SSZ Prague 11/18/1993 Frankfurt 06/25/1997 - - –
Telefonica O2 Prague 03/14/1995 Frankfurt 05/17/1996 London (GDR) 08/02/1999 –
Unipetrol Prague 09/01/1997 Frankfurt 09/10/1997 - - 7
Estonia Eesti Telekomi Tallinn 02/11/1999 Frankfurt 05/27/1999 London (GDR) 07/29/1999 75
Merko Ehitus Tallinn 07/22/1997 Frankfurt 10/28/1997 - - 70
Norma Aktsia Tallinn 08/12/1996 Frankfurt 09/30/1997 - - –
Hungary Borsodchem Budapest 03/21/1996 Frankfurt 07/17/1996 London (GDR) 07/22/1999 84 / London inactive 05/12/03-09/30/04
Danubius Hotel Budapest 12/23/1992 Frankfurt 07/01/1994 - - –
Egis Budapest 07/25/1994 Frankfurt 07/02/1996 - - –
Elmu Budapest 12/15/1998 Frankfurt 03/17/1999 - - 66
Emasz Budapest 12/15/1998 Frankfurt 03/10/1999 - - 61
Fotex Budapest 01/02/1991 Frankfurt 06/07/1994 - - –
Inter-Europa Bank Budapest 07/19/1994 Frankfurt 11/22/1996 - - –
Konzum Budapest 01/09/1991 Frankfurt 03/05/1991 - - 82
Magyar TKom Budapest 11/14/1997 Frankfurt 12/15/1997 London (ADS) 08/02/1999 21
Mol Magyar Budapest 11/28/1995 Frankfurt 07/05/1996 London (GDR) 06/26/1997 158
OTP Bank Budapest 08/10/1995 Frankfurt 10/24/1996 London (GDR) 08/02/1999 –
Raba Budapest 12/17/1997 Frankfurt 01/07/1998 - - 15
Richter Gedeon Budapest 11/09/1994 Frankfurt 10/15/1996 London (GDR) 11/16/1995 London inactive from 1997
Synergon Budapest 05/05/1999 Frankfurt 05/11/1999 - - 4
Tiszai Vegyi Kom Budapest 08/06/1996 Frankfurt 10/29/1996 London (GDR) 05/05/1998 60 / London inactive from 2001
Zwack Unicum Budapest 05/27/1993 Frankfurt 11/30/1993 - - 133
Poland Bank BPH Warsaw 09/16/1996 - - London (GDR) 01/17/2002 –
Mostostal Export Warsaw 05/28/1992 Frankfrut (ADR) 07/03/1997 - - –
PKN Orlen Warsaw 11/26/1999 Frankfurt (GDR) 01/03/2000 - - 26
Softbank Warsaw 07/20/1998 Frankfurt (GDR) 01/23/2001 London (GDR) 07/28/1998 6
Stalexport Warsaw 09/16/1996 Frankfurt 07/19/1999 - - –
Telekomunikacja PL Warsaw 11/18/1998 Frankfurt (GDR) 12/02/1998 London (GDR) 08/10/1999 10
Russia Lukoil RTS 09/01/1995 Frankfurt (ADR) 06/28/1996 London (ADR) 07/20/2001 –
This table presents all collected stock price time series from Eastern European enterprises that are cross-listed in Frankfurt, London or in both of
the foreign markets. All enterprises are displayed with initial listing dates for corresponding stock markets. Since some stocks are traded indirectly
(as depository receipts), the specific security type is indicated in case of necessity. For this table only stocks with liquid trading activity (daily price
quotation) are considered. If stocks from an enterprise are introduced to a foreign market within one year after the IPO at home, the corresponding
trading days before this event are calculated in the remark column.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Series Mean Max Min StdDev Skew Kurt JarqueBera Prob Obs
DLBANKBPL 0.0005 0.2075 -0.2486 0.0250 -0.08 11.60 8266 (0.0000) 2684
DLBANKBXSQ 0.0014 0.3058 -0.2624 0.0307 1.26 33.12 49140 (0.0000) 1291
DLBORSOHU 0.0000 0.2101 -1.5794 0.0399 -22.37 881.33 905928778 (0.0000) 2811
DLBORSOFR 0.0000 0.3504 -1.6029 0.0432 -18.81 702.63 55777735 (0.0000) 2727
DLBORSOXSQ -0.0002 0.2703 -1.3568 0.0390 -21.70 764.50 47050733 (0.0000) 1941
DLCEZCZ 0.0000 0.3295 -2.4015 0.0473 -38.06 1939.09 53701136 (0.0000) 3433
DLCEZFR 0.0000 0.2228 -2.3914 0.0496 -35.48 1711.27 38562325 (0.0000) 3166
DLDANUBHU 0.0003 0.6730 -0.2506 0.0310 3.19 79.35 894426 (0.0000) 3657
DLDANUBFR 0.0004 0.2943 -0.4477 0.0268 -1.49 42.92 217707 (0.0000) 3260
DLEESTITA 0.0001 0.1585 -0.1051 0.0165 0.41 13.02 8650 (0.0000) 2056
DLEESTIFR 0.0002 0.1926 -0.1317 0.0217 0.94 14.77 11736 (0.0000) 1981
DLEESTIXSQD 0.0002 0.2792 -0.2624 0.0217 -0.86 57.21 237327 (0.0000) 1936
DLEGISHU 0.0006 0.1889 -0.3535 0.0264 -1.01 20.51 41973 (0.0000) 3244
DLEGISFR 0.0003 0.1536 -0.3136 0.0285 -0.87 14.22 14714 (0.0000) 2738
DLELMUHU 0.0004 0.1737 -0.1729 0.0247 0.14 12.04 7142 (0.0000) 2098
DLELMUFR 0.0003 0.1367 -0.1639 0.0199 -0.38 13.95 10204 (0.0000) 2032
DLEMASZHU 0.0004 0.1146 -0.1683 0.0213 -0.05 7.71 1944 (0.0000) 2098
DLEMASZFR 0.0006 0.1770 -0.2017 0.0191 -0.25 21.17 28037 (0.0000) 2037
DLFOTEXHU 0.0000 0.2381 -0.3429 0.0310 0.30 14.12 21570 (0.0000) 4172
DLFOTEXFR 0.0000 0.3761 -0.2744 0.0441 0.44 9.88 6538 (0.0000) 3257
DLIEUBKHU -0.0005 0.2238 -2.2866 0.0498 -30.60 1385.38 25912592 (0.0000) 3248
DLIEUBKFR -0.0009 0.2165 -2.2581 0.0546 -27.60 1122.11 13783938 (0.0000) 2635
DLKOMBKCZ 0.0000 0.1915 -0.2372 0.0264 -0.58 13.95 16854 (0.0000) 3334
DLKOMBKFR 0.0012 0.5614 -0.3314 0.0274 5.04 126.10 1330322 (0.0000) 2093
DLKOMBKFRG 0.0002 0.3228 -0.4090 0.0328 -0.45 26.35 62271 (0.0000) 2738
DLKOMBXSQ 0.0004 0.2557 -0.3567 0.0352 -0.42 15.43 15852 (0.0000) 2453
DLKONZUHU -0.0015 1.1192 -3.1585 0.0826 -13.33 540.67 50317047 (0.0000) 4167
DLKONZUFR -0.0008 0.5921 -0.5705 0.0572 0.57 24.66 80107 (0.0000) 4085
DLLUKOIRS 0.0009 0.2583 -0.3912 0.0347 -0.43 16.30 21865 (0.0000) 2955
DLLUKOIFRA 0.0008 0.2556 -0.2627 0.0334 -0.10 9.26 4486 (0.0000) 2740
DLLUKOIXSQ 0.0015 0.1114 -0.1204 0.0220 -0.26 5.25 316 (0.0000) 1420
DLMAGTKHU 0.0002 0.1174 -0.1197 0.0219 -0.14 6.09 954 (0.0000) 2380
DLMAGTKFR 0.0001 0.1690 -0.1253 0.0263 0.20 6.89 1501 (0.0000) 2359
DLMAGTKXSQ -0.0001 0.1641 -0.1606 0.0227 0.03 9.57 3484 (0.0000) 1934
DLMERKOTA 0.0005 0.2280 -1.1628 0.0374 -15.14 438.20 19531088 (0.0000) 2463
DLMERKOFR 0.0004 0.1780 -0.7024 0.0356 -9.29 179.93 3155680 (0.0000) 2393
DLMOLHU 0.0009 0.1524 -0.2189 0.0239 -0.36 10.31 6497 (0.0000) 2893
DLMOLFR 0.0008 0.1246 -0.1643 0.0264 -0.07 6.42 1336 (0.0000) 2735
DLMOLXSQ 0.0006 0.1513 -0.2128 0.0237 -0.41 9.57 4531 (0.0000) 2481
DLMOSTOPL -0.0007 1.9896 -3.6984 0.0749 -26.45 1693.53 45365570 (0.0000) 3806
DLMOSTOFRA -0.0005 0.5465 -0.4520 0.0593 0.30 15.49 16121 (0.0000) 2476
DLNORMATA 0.0005 0.2412 -0.2167 0.0257 -0.29 18.35 26645 (0.0000) 2709
DLNORMAFR -0.0001 0.3028 -0.3847 0.0301 -1.48 31.76 84051 (0.0000) 2413
DLOTPBKHU 0.0005 0.1891 -2.2957 0.0494 -33.84 1573.19 30577489 (0.0000) 2971
DLOTPBKFR 0.0004 0.1873 -2.2402 0.0520 -30.47 1301.65 18705011 (0.0000) 2656
DLOTPBKXSQ 0.0000 0.1694 -2.2331 0.0552 -34.30 1389.05 15519083 (0.0000) 1934
DLPKNORPL 0.0006 0.0834 -0.0880 0.0203 0.06 4.01 79 (0.0000) 1850
DLPKNORFRG 0.0005 0.1263 -0.1859 0.0248 0.01 7.01 1219 (0.0000) 1824
DLPLIVAZA 0.0012 0.7895 -0.2830 0.0310 7.04 171.29 3697844 (0.0000) 3112
DLPLIVAFRG 0.0003 0.3811 -0.2775 0.0293 0.24 23.51 45721 (0.0000) 2606
DLPLIVAXSQ 0.0002 0.2252 -0.1391 0.0239 0.40 10.98 6785 (0.0000) 2530
DLRABAHU -0.0004 0.2016 -0.2459 0.0260 -0.10 12.69 9232 (0.0000) 2357
DLRABAFR -0.0005 0.4414 -0.6189 0.0314 -2.14 94.14 812288 (0.0000) 2342
DLRICHTHU 0.0008 0.2168 -0.2378 0.0267 -0.54 15.76 21650 (0.0000) 3167
DLRICHTFR 0.0005 0.1631 -0.3829 0.0284 -1.13 21.40 38126 (0.0000) 2663
DLRICHTXSQ 0.0009 0.7926 -0.1907 0.0290 6.95 199.52 4691550 (0.0000) 2901
DLRMSHOCZ 0.0000 0.2043 -0.3045 0.0243 -0.83 22.73 55982 (0.0000) 3428
DLRMSHOFR -0.0004 0.8666 -0.4080 0.0347 6.22 189.11 3963561 (0.0000) 2734
DLSETUZCZ -0.0002 0.2836 -0.3137 0.0265 -0.29 29.10 95742 (0.0000) 3371
DLSETUZFR -0.0003 0.5887 -0.8677 0.0323 -6.69 287.26 9171510 (0.0000) 2718
DLSOFTBPL -0.0001 0.1392 -0.7483 0.0354 -4.62 96.51 810871 (0.0000) 2204
DLSOFTBFRG 0.0001 0.2167 -0.3293 0.0425 0.05 10.22 3367 (0.0000) 1553
DLSOFTBXSQ 0.0000 0.5447 -0.7470 0.0429 -2.30 85.81 630014 (0.0000) 2198
DLSSZCZ 0.0005 0.2434 -0.1431 0.0242 0.77 16.90 27894 (0.0000) 3421
DLSSZFR 0.0008 0.4640 -0.6174 0.0233 -4.64 287.00 8349843 (0.0000) 2482
DLSTALEPL -0.0009 0.2877 -0.3023 0.0398 0.48 10.21 5907 (0.0000) 2684
DLSTALEFR -0.0010 0.6444 -0.6568 0.0607 0.46 34.96 82814 (0.0000) 1944
DLSYNERHU -0.0003 0.1497 -0.1666 0.0302 0.32 8.17 2262 (0.0000) 1997
DLSYNERFR -0.0003 0.4364 -0.2540 0.0410 0.62 14.29 10714 (0.0000) 1993
DLTELEPPL 0.0003 0.1418 -0.1172 0.0243 0.15 4.84 307 (0.0000) 2117
DLTELEPFRG 0.0003 0.1433 -0.1492 0.0292 0.05 5.40 506 (0.0000) 2107
DLTELEPXSQ 0.0001 0.1082 -0.0991 0.0244 0.12 4.23 126 (0.0000) 1928
DLTELO2CZ -0.0005 0.1175 -2.2794 0.0462 -38.90 1917.38 47079346 (0.0000) 3078
DLTELO2FR -0.0006 0.1551 -2.3228 0.0513 -33.47 1513.18 26374044 (0.0000) 2770
DLTELO2XSQ 0.0002 0.2479 -0.2067 0.0268 0.38 16.60 14938 (0.0000) 1934
DLTISZAHU 0.0004 0.2083 -0.2189 0.0285 -0.09 11.77 8704 (0.0000) 2713
DLTISZAFR 0.0004 0.2717 -0.3102 0.0282 -0.26 18.92 28046 (0.0000) 2653
DLTISZAXSQ -0.0002 0.1574 -0.1385 0.0208 0.52 19.14 24610 (0.0000) 2258
DLUNIPECZ 0.0004 0.1529 -0.2239 0.0257 -0.34 9.77 4694 (0.0000) 2434
DLUNIPEFR 0.0004 0.2076 -0.3258 0.0333 -0.50 13.72 11719 (0.0000) 2427
DLZWACKHU 0.0002 0.2815 -0.2133 0.0252 0.47 22.19 54551 (0.0000) 3546
DLZWACKFR 0.0001 0.7496 -0.1632 0.0261 6.93 205.60 5864440 (0.0000) 3413
Log differences (DL) from all time series are summarized in alphabetical order. Descripitve statistics for each enter-
prise are shown for home markets first (acronyms CZ=Czech Republic, TA=Tallinn (Estonia) HU=Hungary, PL=Poland,
RS=Russia, ZA=Zagreb (Croatia)), and for Frankfurt and London in the following lines. The columns present mean,
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera normality test including its significance, and
the number of observations, over which these figures are calculated.
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Table 4: Standard Deviation, relative to the Cross-Listing
Foreign Listings 0 1 2 3
Series Std. Dev. Obs. Std. Dev. Obs. Std. Dev. Obs. Std. Dev. Obs.
DLBANKBPL 0.0286 1393 0.0205 1291
DLBANKBXSQ 0.0307 1291
DLBORSOHU 0.0244 84 0.0318 786 0.0432 1941
DLBORSOFR 0.0357 786 0.0458 1941
DLBORSOXSQ 0.0390 1941
DLCEZCZ 0.0365 267 0.0222 3166
DLCEZFR 0.0256 3166
DLDANUBHU 0.0841 130 0.0268 3260
DLDANUBFR 0.0268 3260
DLEESTITA 0.0224 75 0.0113 45 0.0164 1936
DLEESTIFR 0.0103 45 0.0219 1936
DLEESTIXSQ 0.0217 1936
DLEGISHU 0.0202 506 0.0274 2738
DLEGISFR 0.0285 2738
DLELMUHU 0.0191 66 0.0249 2032
DLELMUFR 0.0199 2032
DLEMASZHU 0.0329 61 0.0208 2037
DLEMASZFR 0.0191 2037
DLFOTEXHU 0.0170 915 0.0339 3257
DLFOTEXFR 0.0441 3257
DLIEUBKHU 0.0230 613 0.0541 2635
DLIEUBKFR 0.0546 2635
DLKOMBKCZ 0.0231 596 0.0220 285 0.0444 360 0.0234 2093
DLKOMBKFRG 0.0303 285 0.0460 360 0.0303 2093
DLKOMBXSQ 0.0481 360 0.0324 2093
DLKOMBKFR 0.0274 2093
DLKONZUHU 0.3515 82 0.0669 4085
DLKONZUFR 0.0572 4085
DLLUKOIRS 0.0327 215 0.0447 1320 0.0219 1420
DLLUKOIFRA 0.0420 1320 0.0228 1420
DLLUKOIXSQ 0.0220 1420
DLMAGTKHU 0.0293 21 0.0263 425 0.0207 1934
DLMAGTKFR 0.0286 425 0.0258 1934
DLMAGTKXSQ 0.0227 1934
DLMERKOTA 0.0237 70 0.0377 2393
DLMERKOFR 0.0356 2393
DLMOLHU 0.0330 158 0.0259 254 0.0230 2481
DLMOLFR 0.0269 254 0.0263 2481
DLMOLXSQ 0.0237 2481
DLMOSTOPL 0.1177 1330 0.0344 2476
DLMOSTOFRA 0.0593 2476
DLNORMATA 0.0237 296 0.0259 2413
DLNORMAFR 0.0301 2413
DLOTPBKHU 0.0292 315 0.0345 722 0.0209 1934
DLOTPBKFR 0.0383 722 0.0239 1934
DLOTPBKXSQ 0.0216 1934
DLPKNORPL 0.0211 26 0.0203 1824
DLPKNORFRG 0.0248 1824
DLPLIVAZA 0.0546 506 0.0243 76 0.0237 2530
DLPLIVAFRG 0.0278 76 0.0293 2530
DLPLIVAXSQ 0.0239 2530
DLRABAHU 0.0390 15 0.0259 2342
DLRABAFR 0.0314 2342
DLRICHTHU 0.0213 266 0.0265 238 0.0272 2663
DLRICHTXSQ 0.0249 238 0.0293 2663
DLRICHTFR 0.0284 2663
DLRMSHOCZ 0.0319 694 0.0219 2734
DLRMSHOFR 0.0347 2734
DLSETUZCZ 0.0280 653 0.0262 2718
DLSETUZFR 0.0323 2718
DLSOFTBPL 0.0332 6 0.0469 645 0.0294 1553
DLSOFTBXSQ 0.0452 645 0.0420 1553
DLSOFTBFRG 0.0425 1553
DLSSZCZ 0.0318 939 0.0206 2482
DLSSZFR 0.0233 2482
DLSTALEPL 0.0365 740 0.0410 1944
DLSTALEFR 0.0607 1944
DLSYNERHU 0.0160 4 0.0302 1993
DLSYNERFR 0.0410 1993
DLTELEPPL 0.0231 10 0.0296 179 0.0238 1928
DLTELEPFRG 0.0346 179 0.0286 1928
DLTELEPXSQ 0.0244 1928
DLTELO2CZ 0.0157 308 0.0814 836 0.0223 1934
DLTELO2FR 0.0841 836 0.0268 1934
DLTELO2XSQ 0.0268 1934
DLTISZAHU 0.0071 60 0.0329 395 0.0280 2258
DLTISZAFR 0.0319 395 0.0275 2258
DLTISZAXSQ 0.0208 2258
DLUNIPECZ 0.0193 7 0.0257 2427
DLUNIPEFR 0.0333 2427
DLZWACKHU 0.0261 133 0.0251 2413
DLZWACKFR 0.0261 2413
This table reports a comparison on standard deviations of log differences (DL). Each standard deviation is calculated
relative to the cross-listing date. The number of observations is provided in the following columns.
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Table 5: Estimates of cross-listing effects on price volatility
Frankfurt first γ0 γfr δ0 δfr λ0 λfr
Eesti Telekomi 0.0002 0.0001 0.0777 0.0216 0.0293 -0.0276
(0.0667) (0.4671) (0.5635) (0.8800) (0.2032) (0.2318)
Egis 0.0003 -0.0004 0.2808 -0.1861 0.0000 0.3216
(0.0000) (0.3315) (0.0000) (0.1374) (0.9759) (0.0869)
Emasz 0.0009 -0.0006 0.0427 0.1450 0.5809 -0.2896
(0.0079) (0.0866) (0.7256) (0.3173) (0.2275) (0.5749)
Fotex 0.0003 0.0004 0.0062 0.1682 0.0089 0.0061
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.7155) (0.0148) (0.0838) (0.3179)
Komercni Banka 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0697 -0.0812 0.1845 -0.1614
(0.0000) (0.1297) (0.0511) (0.6353) (0.0004) (0.0023)
Lukoil 0.0005 -0.0004 0.1115 0.1657 0.0329 -0.0058
(0.0004) (0.0972) (0.0002) (0.0565) (0.0048) (0.6562)
Magyar Tkom -0.0004 0.0002 0.0341 -0.0171 0.0069 -0.0033
(0.1618) (0.4183) (0.7998) (0.9014) (0.0025) (0.1536)
Mol Magyar 0.0012 -0.0009 0.0785 0.1518 -0.0001 0.0045
(0.0008) (0.0084) (0.3222) (0.1102) (0.0105) (0.0005)
Norma Aktsia 0.0004 0.0001 0.2291 -0.0416 0.0195 0.0110
(0.0001) (0.3400) (0.0051) (0.6825) (0.1054) (0.4903)
OTP Bank 0.0005 0.0034 0.0681 -0.0680 0.0136 -0.0240
(0.0084) (0.3508) (0.4388) (0.4396) (0.0414) (0.1349)
PKN Orlen 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0782 0.1179 0.0060 -0.0022
(0.8897) (0.9048) (0.5402) (0.3750) (0.2088) (0.6478)
Raba 0.0001 0.0003 -0.4742 0.7774 0.1908 -0.1703
(0.8626) (0.3663) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Stalexport 0.0009 0.0000 0.1894 0.1204 0.1036 -0.0988
(0.0000) (0.8579) (0.0050) (0.3114) (0.0042) (0.0064)
Telefonica O2 0.0001 0.0032 0.1962 -0.1968 0.0039 -0.0134
(0.2010) (0.2583) (0.1293) (0.1281) (0.0163) (0.2027)
Telekomunikacja PL 0.0002 0.0003 -0.8178 0.9186 0.0155 -0.0151
(0.5273) (0.1960) (0.0118) (0.0049) (0.0152) (0.0178)
Unipetrol 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.2784 0.3632 -0.0602 0.0705
(0.2752) (0.2224) (0.1585) (0.0758) (0.3606) (0.2845)
London first γ0 γlo δ0 δlo λ0 λlo
Bank BPH 0.0006 -0.0003 0.3077 -0.0995 0.3067 -0.2608
(0.0000) (0.0191) (0.0524) (0.6050) (0.0131) (0.0372)
Borsodchem 0.0003 0.0014 0.1005 -0.1000 0.0231 -0.0051
(0.1115) (0.4114) (0.0480) (0.0494) (0.0004) (0.8453)
Richter Gedeon 0.0003 0.0000 0.4174 -0.0434 0.0357 -0.0049
(0.0002) (0.9470) (0.0043) (0.8136) (0.6721) (0.9540)
Softbank -0.0009 0.0018 -3.3268 3.3409 2.6929 -2.6328
(0.3777) (0.1021) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0008)
The table presents Generalized Method of Moment estimates with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. The variables ∆Pt and Vt are price change and volume (in ten
millions of shares). All parameters with an index different from 0 present interaction with
the respective cross-listing dummy. Cross-listing dummies are set from 0 to 1 after the
cross-listing. The table only contains enterprises from our data set, from which we are able
to obtain volume data with less than 11% of missing values. Each enterprise regression is
printed in one double-row. In the first row parameter estimates are shown and followed
by their statistical significance in the second.
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Table 6: Estimates of cross-listing effects on price volatility (two cross-listings)
Frankfurt first γ0 γfr γlo δ0 δfr δlo λ0 λfr λlo
Eesti Telekomi 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0777 -0.0575 0.0789 0.0293 -0.0076 -0.0200
(0.0667) (0.5088) (0.0004) (0.5635) (0.7379) (0.5029) (0.2032) (0.8081) (0.3433)
Komercni Banka 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0651 0.0582 0.4275 0.1759 0.6596 -0.8216
(0.0000) (0.0049) (0.4454) (0.0662) (0.7852) (0.0724) (0.0007) (0.1204) (0.0513)
Lukoil 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0006 0.1115 0.1602 -0.1148 0.0329 -0.0089 -0.0044
(0.0004) (0.7490) (0.0435) (0.0002) (0.0716) (0.2645) (0.0048) (0.5152) (0.5823)
Magyar Tkom -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0341 -0.0617 0.0557 0.0069 -0.0009 -0.0030
(0.1618) (0.6167) (0.0253) (0.7998) (0.6653) (0.3818) (0.0025) (0.7347) (0.0213)
Mol Magyar 0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0785 0.1005 0.0530 -0.0001 0.0093 -0.0046
(0.0008) (0.0441) (0.2298) (0.3222) (0.4038) (0.6201) (0.0105) (0.1200) (0.4526)
OTP Bank 0.0005 0.0002 0.0045 0.0681 0.1119 -0.1799 0.0136 -0.0106 -0.0210
(0.0084) (0.4783) (0.3756) (0.4388) (0.3887) (0.0594) (0.0414) (0.1195) (0.3378)
Telefonica O2 0.0001 0.0101 -0.0098 0.1962 -0.1982 0.1449 0.0039 -0.1164 0.1130
(0.2010) (0.3092) (0.3250) (0.1293) (0.1256) (0.0003) (0.0163) (0.3383) (0.3525)
Telekomunikacja PL 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.8178 0.6792 0.2916 0.0155 0.0360 -0.0510
(0.5273) (0.2521) (0.0190) (0.0118) (0.0424) (0.0009) (0.0152) (0.0761) (0.0082)
London first
Richter Gedeon 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.4174 -0.3277 0.2900 0.0357 0.1387 -0.1438
(0.0002) (0.9029) (0.8526) (0.0043) (0.0751) (0.0700) (0.6721) (0.2080) (0.0453)
Softbank -0.0009 0.0031 -0.0022 -3.3268 3.3261 0.2502 2.6929 -2.6550 0.0415
(0.3775) (0.0232) (0.0169) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0355) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.3570)
The table presents Generalized Method of Moment estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The variables ∆Pt and Vt are
price change and volume (in ten millions of shares). All parameters with an index different from 0 present interaction with the respective cross-listing
dummy. Cross-listing dummies are set from 0 to 1 after the cross-listing. The table only contains enterprises from our data set, from which we are
able to obtain volume data with less than 11% of missing values. Each enterprise regression is printed in one double-row. In the first row parameter
estimates are shown and followed by their statistical significance in the second.
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Table 7: Estimates of cross-listing effects on price volatility (multiple cross-listings)
Frankfurt first γ0 γfr γlo γfr2 δ0 δfr δlo δfr2 λ0 λfr λlo λfr2
Komercni Banka 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0651 0.0582 0.4743 -0.3010 0.1759 0.6596 -0.7222 -0.0820
(0.0000) (0.0049) (0.1885) (0.0453) (0.0662) (0.7852) (0.0697) (0.0836) (0.0007) (0.1204) (0.0948) (0.3934)
The table presents Generalized Method of Moment estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The variables ∆Pt and Vt are
price change and volume (in ten millions of shares). All parameters with an index different from 0 present interaction with the respective cross-listing
dummy. Cross-listing dummies are set from 0 to 1 after the cross-listing. The table only contains enterprises from our data set, from which we are
able to obtain volume data with less than 11% of missing values. Each enterprise regression is printed in one double-row. In the first row parameter
estimates are shown and followed by their statistical significance in the second.
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Table 8: Volatility Spillover (one cross-listing)
Enterprise For.List from Market to Market Spill Prob. AR1-Share
Bank BPH 1 Warsaw XSQ 0.8387 (0.0000) 0.0048
Bank BPH 1 XSQ Warsaw 0.0001 (0.7091) n/a
CEZ 1 Prag FR 0.0993 (0.0000) 0.0370
CEZ 1 FR Prag 0.0186 (0.0001) 0.0125
Eesti Telekomi 1 Tallinn FR 0.1503 (0.0000) 0.0390
Eesti Telekomi 1 FR Tallinn 0.0013 (0.0001) 0.0159
Egis 1 Budapest FR 0.4355 (0.0000) 0.0102
Egis 1 FR Budapest 0.0021 (0.0050) 0.0204
Elmu 1 Budapest FR 0.0177 (0.0000) -0.2603
Elmu 1 FR Budapest -0.0003 (0.0541) n/a
Emasz 1 Budapest FR 0.0637 (0.0000) 0.0389
Emasz 1 FR Budapest 0.0543 (0.0000) 0.2301
Fotex 1 Budapest FR 0.1960 (0.0000) 0.0368
Fotex 1 FR Budapest 0.2855 (0.0000) -0.2321
Komercni Banka 1 Prag FR 0.5071 (0.0000) 0.0435
Komercni Banka 1 FR Prag 0.0201 (0.0000) 0.0016
Konzum 1 Budapest FR 0.0092 (0.0000) 0.0154
Konzum 1 FR Budapest 0.2070 (0.0000) -0.1085
Lukoil 1 Moscow FR 0.1091 (0.0000) 0.0782
Lukoil 1 FR Moscow 0.1873 (0.0000) 0.1011
Magyar TKom 1 Budapest FR 0.1183 (0.0000) 0.0138
Magyar TKom 1 FR Budapest 0.0319 (0.0000) 0.0376
Mol Magyar 1 Budapest FR 0.2619 (0.0000) 0.0187
Mol Magyar 1 FR Budapest 0.0116 (0.0960) n/a
Mostostal Export 1 Warsaw FR 0.1573 (0.0000) -0.0144
Mostostal Export 1 FR Warsaw 0.0003 (0.0000) 0.0056
Norma 1 Tallinn FR 0.0070 (0.0000) -0.1172
Norma 1 FR Tallinn 0.0037 (0.0010) -0.0078
OTP Bank 1 Budapest FR 0.0114 (0.0000) 0.0986
OTP Bank 1 FR Budapest 0.0260 (0.0014) 0.0153
PKN Orlen 1 Warsaw FR 0.0376 (0.0000) 0.0490
PKN Orlen 1 FR Warsaw 0.0002 (0.9650) n/a
Pliva 1 Zagreb FR 0.1014 (0.0000) 0.0380
Pliva 1 FR Zagreb 0.0245 (0.0000) -0.0134
Raba 1 Budapest FR 0.0324 (0.0000) -0.0440
Raba 1 FR Budapest 0.0001 (0.2033) n/a
Softbank 1 Warsaw FR 0.0032 (0.0000) -0.1281
Softbank 1 FR Warsaw -0.0001 (0.0001) n/a
Stalexport 1 Warsaw FR 0.0046 (0.0000) 0.0130
Stalexport 1 FR Warsaw -0.0005 (0.5208) n/a
Synergon 1 Budapest FR 0.4979 (0.0000) 0.0332
Synergon 1 FR Budapest 0.0007 (0.0000) 0.0085
Telekomunikacja PL 1 Warsaw FR 0.1332 (0.0000) 0.0007
Telekomunikacja PL 1 FR Warsaw 0.0005 (0.8646) n/a
Unipetrol 1 Prag FR 0.4899 (0.0000) 0.0133
Unipetrol 1 FR Prag 0.0012 (0.0027) 0.0088
This table reports detailed estimates on GARCH volatility spillovers. Column 1 pro-
vides enterprise information. Column 2 gives the number of foreign listings on the period
of estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the direction of the spillover coefficient, which is
presented in columns 5 and 6. In the last column, the AR(1)-parameter from the variance
equation is calculated relative to its value without a cross-listing term.
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Table 9: Volatility Spillover (two cross-listings, part 1)
Enterprise For.List from Market to Market Spill1 Prob.1 Spill2 Prob.2 AR1-Share
Eesti Telekomi 2 Tallinn FR 0.1573 (0.0000) 0.0803
Eesti Telekomi 2 Tallinn XSQ 0.0694 (0.0000) -0.0268
Eesti Telekomi 2 FR Tallinn 0.0010 (0.0000) 0.0080
Eesti Telekomi 2 FR XSQ 0.0382 (0.0000) -0.0100
Eesti Telekomi 2 XSQ Tallinn -0.0001 (0.5739) n/a
Eesti Telekomi 2 XSQ FR -0.0015 (0.0245) n/a
Eesti Telekomi 2 Tallinn and FR XSQ 0.0571 (0.0000) -0.0241 (0.0000) -0.0022
Eesti Telekomi 2 FR and XSQ Tallinn 0.0011 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.2745) 0.0059
Komercni Banka 2 Prag FRG 0.4733 (0.0000) 0.0475
Komercni Banka 2 Prag XSQ 0.2071 (0.0000) -0.0012
Komercni Banka 2 FRG Prag 0.0309 (0.0000) 0.0022
Komercni Banka 2 FRG XSQ 0.1259 (0.0000) -0.0229
Komercni Banka 2 XSQ Prag -0.0025 (0.0002) n/a
Komercni Banka 2 XSQ FRG 0.2492 (0.0000) -0.0209
Komercni Banka 2 Prag and FRG XSQ 0.1951 (0.0000) 0.0159 (0.0405) -0.0038
Komercni Banka 2 Prag and XSQ FRG 0.4739 (0.0000) 0.0026 (0.2903) 0.0482
Komercni Banka 2 FRG and XSQ Prag 0.0302 (0.0000) -0.0032 (0.0001) 0.0072
Lukoil 2 Moscow FR 0.0073 (0.0041) 0.0609
Lukoil 2 Moscow XSQ 0.0047 (0.0673) n/a
Lukoil 2 FR Moscow 0.0812 (0.0000) 0.0536
Lukoil 2 FR XSQ 0.0014 (0.5950) n/a
Lukoil 2 XSQ Moscow 0.0850 (0.0000) 0.0563
Lukoil 2 XSQ FR 0.0040 (0.1103) n/a
Lukoil 2 Moscow and XSQ FR 0.0116 (0.0024) -0.0063 (0.1048) 0.0374
Lukoil 2 Moscow and FR XSQ 0.0069 (0.0394) -0.0030 (0.4005) n/a
Lukoil 2 FR and XSQ Moscow 0.0541 (0.0301) 0.0436 (0.0848) n/a
Magyar TKom 2 Budapest FR 0.0067 (0.0000) 0.0506
Magyar TKom 2 Budapest XSQ 0.1239 (0.0000) 0.0620
Magyar TKom 2 FR Budapest 0.0023 (0.0108) n/a
Magyar TKom 2 FR XSQ 0.0680 (0.0000) 0.0305
Magyar TKom 2 XSQ Budapest -0.0001 (0.8074) n/a
Magyar TKom 2 XSQ FR 0.0005 (0.3451) n/a
Magyar TKom 2 Budapest and XSQ FR 0.0076 (0.0000) -0.0011 (0.0717) 0.0482
Magyar TKom 2 Budapest and FR XSQ 0.1044 (0.0000) 0.0526 (0.0000) 0.0589
Magyar TKom 2 FR and XSQ Budapest 0.0023 (0.0104) -0.0003 (0.6471) n/a
Mol Magyar 2 Budapest FR 0.2632 (0.0000) 0.0045
Mol Magyar 2 Budapest XSQ 0.0035 (0.0026) 0.0234
Mol Magyar 2 FR Budapest 0.0022 (0.0065) 0.0129
Mol Magyar 2 FR XSQ 0.0028 (0.0070) 0.0115
Mol Magyar 2 XSQ Budapest 0.0018 (0.0645) n/a
Mol Magyar 2 XSQ FR 0.2081 (0.0000) 0.0236
Mol Magyar 2 Budapest and XSQ FR 0.2052 (0.0000) 0.0825 (0.0027) 0.0150
Mol Magyar 2 Budapest and FR XSQ 0.0031 (0.0146) 0.0020 (0.0676) n/a
Mol Magyar 2 FR and XSQ Budapest 0.0019 (0.0253) 0.0013 (0.1713) n/a
This table reports detailed estimates on GARCH volatility spillovers. Column 1 provides enterprise information. Column 2 gives the number of foreign listings on the period of estimate. Columns 3
and 4 present the direction of the spillover coefficients, which is presented in columns 5 through 8. In the last column, the AR(1)-parameter from the variance equation is calculated relative to its value
without a cross-listing term.
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Table 10: Volatility Spillover (two cross-listings, part 2)
Enterprise For.List from Market to Market Spill1 Prob.1 Spill2 Prob.2 AR1-Share
OTP Bank 2 Budapest FR 0.2085 (0.0000) 0.0109
OTP Bank 2 Budapest XSQ 0.0471 (0.0000) 0.0102
OTP Bank 2 FR Budapest 0.0039 (0.0222) n/a
OTP Bank 2 FR XSQ 0.0234 (0.0000) 0.0005
OTP Bank 2 XSQ Budapest 0.0028 (0.0261) n/a
OTP Bank 2 XSQ FR 0.0963 (0.0000) -0.0123
OTP Bank 2 Budapest and XSQ FR 0.1882 (0.0000) 0.0165 (0.3371) 0.0099
OTP Bank 2 Budapest and FR XSQ 0.0462 (0.0000) 0.0012 (0.8017) 0.0534
OTP Bank 2 FR and XSQ Budapest 0.0034 (0.0311) 0.0028 (0.0324) n/a
Pliva 2 Zagreb FR 0.3641 (0.0000) -0.0102
Pliva 2 Zagreb XSQ 0.0010 (0.0000) -0.1300
Pliva 2 FR Zagreb 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0428
Pliva 2 FR XSQ 0.0003 (0.0000) -0.0056
Pliva 2 XSQ Zagreb 0.0166 (0.0000) 0.0229
Pliva 2 XSQ FR 0.1730 (0.0000) 0.0286
Pliva 2 Zagreb and XSQ FR 0.2680 (0.0000) 0.3171 (0.0000) -0.0033
Pliva 2 Zagreb and FR XSQ 0.0004 (0.0695) 0.0008 (0.0000) -0.1276
Pliva 2 FR and XSQ Zagreb 0.0027 (0.0000) 0.0166 (0.0000) 0.2408
Softbank 2 Warsaw XSQ 0.3394 (0.0000) 0.0057
Softbank 2 Warsaw FR 0.0105 (0.0000) 0.0110
Softbank 2 XSQ Warsaw -0.0011 (0.1223) n/a
Softbank 2 XSQ FR 0.0002 (0.0358) n/a
Softbank 2 FR Warsaw 0.0025 (0.4631) n/a
Softbank 2 FR XSQ -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0097
Softbank 2 Warsaw and FR XSQ 0.2468 (0.0000) -0.0282 (0.0000) 0.0114
Softbank 2 Warsaw and XSQ FR 0.0104 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.1074) 0.0116
Softbank 2 XSQ and FR Warsaw -0.0011 (0.1244) 0.0026 (0.4577) n/a
Telefonica O2 CR 2 Prag FR 0.0213 (0.0000) 0.0216
Telefonica O2 CR 2 Prag XSQ 0.0397 (0.0000) 0.0173
Telefonica O2 CR 2 FR Prag -0.0009 (0.4005) n/a
Telefonica O2 CR 2 FR XSQ 0.0261 (0.0000) 0.0127
Telefonica O2 CR 2 XSQ Prag -0.0014 (0.0028) n/a
Telefonica O2 CR 2 XSQ FR 0.0002 (0.3843) n/a
Telefonica O2 CR 2 Prag and XSQ FR 0.0216 (0.0000) -0.0005 (0.3374) 0.0200
Telefonica O2 CR 2 Prag and FR XSQ 0.1373 (0.0000) 0.0463 (0.0000) -0.0042
Telefonica O2 CR 2 FR and XSQ Prag -0.0004 (0.7199) -0.0014 (0.0036) n/a
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 Warsaw FR 0.1776 (0.0000) 0.0054
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 Warsaw XSQ 0.0108 (0.1498) n/a
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 FR Warsaw 0.0053 (0.0906) n/a
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 FR XSQ 0.0092 (0.0158) n/a
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 XSQ Warsaw 0.0080 (0.2250) n/a
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 XSQ FR 0.1305 (0.0000) -0.0045
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 Warsaw and XSQ FR 0.1986 (0.0000) -0.0273 (0.0983) 0.0049
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 Warsaw and FR XSQ 0.0070 (0.3494) 0.0085 (0.0263) n/a
Telekomunikacja Polska 2 FR and XSQ Warsaw 0.0046 (0.1458) 0.0052 (0.4319) n/a
This table reports detailed estimates on GARCH volatility spillovers. Column 1 provides enterprise information. Column 2 gives the number of foreign listings on the period of estimate. Columns 3
and 4 present the direction of the spillover coefficients, which is presented in columns 5 through 8. In the last column, the AR(1)-parameter from the variance equation is calculated relative to its value
without a cross-listing term.
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Table 11: Volatility Spillover (three cross-listings)
Enterprise For.List from Market to Market Spill1 Prob1 Spill2 Prob2 Spill3 Prob3 AR1-Share
Komercni Banka 3 Prag FRG 0.5151 (0.0000) 0.1034
Komercni Banka 3 Prag XSQ 0.2239 (0.0000) -0.0013
Komercni Banka 3 Prag FR 0.0292 (0.0000) -0.1497
Komercni Banka 3 FRG Prag 0.0118 (0.0346) n/a
Komercni Banka 3 FRG XSQ 0.1232 (0.0000) -0.0268
Komercni Banka 3 FRG FR 0.0027 (0.0000) 0.1752
Komercni Banka 3 XSQ Prag -0.0027 (0.0109) n/a
Komercni Banka 3 XSQ FRG 0.2195 (0.0000) 0.0243
Komercni Banka 3 XSQ FR 0.0073 (0.0000) -0.0412
Komercni Banka 3 FR Prag -0.0018 (0.4626) n/a
Komercni Banka 3 FR XSQ -0.0035 (0.3322) n/a
Komercni Banka 3 FR FRG 0.0714 (0.0000) 0.0477
Komercni Banka 3 Prag and FRG XSQ 0.2195 (0.0000) 0.0049 (0.5174) -0.0018
Komercni Banka 3 Prag and FRG FR 0.0355 (0.0000) -0.0023 (0.0000) -0.1709
Komercni Banka 3 Prag and XSQ FRG 0.5157 (0.0000) 0.0006 (0.7530) 0.1038
Komercni Banka 3 Prag and XSQ FR 0.0284 (0.0000) -0.0020 (0.0001) -0.1230
Komercni Banka 3 Prag and FR FRG 0.1529 (0.0005) -0.0046 (0.6937) 0.0333
Komercni Banka 3 Prag and FR XSQ 0.2139 (0.0000) -0.0037 (0.1637) 0.0125
Komercni Banka 3 FRG and XSQ Prag 0.0118 (0.0383) -0.0032 (0.0121) n/a
Komercni Banka 3 FRG and XSQ FR 0.0053 (0.0000) 0.0020 (0.0000) 0.1313
Komercni Banka 3 XSQ and FR Prag 0.0049 (0.2121) -0.0022 (0.3243) n/a
Komercni Banka 3 XSQ and FR FRG 0.1582 (0.0000) 0.1678 (0.0000) 0.0034
Komercni Banka 3 Prag, FRG, and XSQ FR 0.0380 (0.0000) -0.0023 (0.0000) -0.0027 (0.0001) -0.1718
Komercni Banka 3 Prag, XSQ, and FR FRG 0.5230 (0.0000) 0.0008 (0.6884) 0.0116 (0.1850) 0.1022
Komercni Banka 3 Prag, FRG, and FR XSQ 0.1949 (0.0000) -0.0013 (0.8394) -0.0038 (0.0319) 0.0202
Komercni Banka 3 FRG. XSQ. FR Prag 0.0104 (0.0868) -0.0010 (0.4281) -0.0015 (0.2199) n/a
This table reports detailed estimates on GARCH volatility spillovers. Column 1 provides enterprise information. Column 2 gives the number of
foreign listings on the period of estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the direction of the spillover coefficients, which is presented in columns 5 through
10. In the last column, the AR(1)-parameter from the variance equation is calculated relative to its value without a cross-listing term.
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Table 12: Overview on Spillover Estimates
Foreign Listing(s) 1 2 3
Average Spillover 0.1355 0.0976 0.1496
Median Spillover 0.0460 0.0463 0.0973
Average from Home 0.1862 0.1422 0.2242
Median from Home 0.1091 0.1239 0.2044
Average from Foreign 0.0576 0.0220 -*
Median from Foreign 0.0201 0.0096 -*
Average between Foreign - 0.0951 0.0700
Median between Foreign - 0.0812 0.0116
Insig./neg. (reduced system) - 22/60 6/22
Insig./neg. (full system) 8/46 10/29 1/4
This table reports descriptive statistics on spillover estimates. Columns 2-4 provide
aggregate information from the following tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. Average and median
spillover coefficients are calculated on the total sample, spillovers from the home market,
spillovers from foreign markets, and spillovers between foreign markets, respectively. The
last double-row distinguishes the share of insignificant or negative estimates between the
full system, which implements all spillover parameters contemporaneously, and reduced
system, which only implements a subset. *=no significant spillovers
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Figure 1: Estimates of Cross-Listing Mean Squared Errors
The figure is a graphical representation of mean squared errors from those 25 enterprises
that have at least 30 trading days before listing abroad. It is separated into three sections.
Mean squared errors before, and after the first and the second cross-listing (if applicable)
are shown from the left to the right. In order to correct for outliers, 5 enterprises with
more than 0.0025 of average daily return are excluded. All numbers are multiplied by 100
to represent daily percentages and guarantee better interpretability.
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Figure 2: Cumulated Abnormal Returns over Time
Figure 3: Cumulated Abnormal Returns over Time (continued)
The figures show cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) over time. For each enterprise that
has at least 30 trading days before listing abroad, returns are regressed on their long run
mean in the time dimension. Residuals taken therefrom are averaged for trading days
relative to the cross-listing and cumulated over time. We calculate their sum (CAR) from
400 trading days before until 600 trading days after the first and the second cross-listing
(if applicable), and plot it over time in the figures. Figure (2) shows the evolution of the
CAR relative to the first cross-listing, figure (3) relative to the second.
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